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During the past year, COVID-19 has forced us to cope with strict lockdowns, follow the developments of a worldwide health crisis, await the roll out of vaccines and try to make sense of the implications of the 
pandemic. Governments were required to respond and communicate with citizens abruptly confined at home. 
Politics and policy also had to adapt. 
The DEMOS H2020 project on populism and democracy could not miss the opportunity to investigate how 
populist politics, on the ascent in recent years, would fare amid the most challenging societal crisis of the past 
decades. Populism, research has already shown, thrives in political crises. It did so when the financial markets 
crashed in 2008 and again when migrants fled to Europe in 2015. It is only logical to assume that populist actors 
would politicise the coronavirus crisis to gain political leverage. 
The project veered off research on important past events of populism towards current new challenges posed 
by COVID-19 – the project itself, having had to adapt and being extended by five months given the unique 
circumstances, is now set to complete its work by April 2022.
This edition of the DEMOS annual report, covering the past year of research, explores those links between 
populism and COVID-19. Preliminary findings show that, at least during the first wave of the crisis, populist 
actors failed to achieve the political support they sought. That, however, does not suggest that populism is coming 
to an end in today’s politics.  
The new studies in this report show these links. They remain relevant for understanding how governments and 
parties across Europe, under the premises of populist politics, exert influence over the judiciary and citizens with 
peculiar policies. New insights into populism remain relevant for understanding the future of liberal democracy 
even when new and unexpected events unfold, such as COVID-19. To that end, the DEMOS team hopes you will 
find the research 
below not only 
insightful but also 
meaningful. 
Finally, the DEMOS 
team, comprised 
by 15 reputable and 
dedicated partners 
across Europe, thanks the scientific community, the media, policy advisors, and citizens for keeping up to date 
about our research and providing us with their insights and interest since we kicked off two years and nine months 
ago. We are particularly grateful for the project experts who reviewed and validated our work, including the 
distinguished external scholars that are a part of the project’s Advisory Board. DEMOS wouldn’t have achieved its 
results without them and you, readers.◆
This edition of the DEMOS annual report also explored the links between 
populism and COVID-19. Preliminary findings show that, at least during the 
first wave of the crisis, populist actors failed to achieve the political support 
they sought. That, however, does not suggest that populism is coming to an end 
in today’s politics.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822590. Any dis-
semination of results here presented reflects only the consortium’s view. The Agen-
cy is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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Populism thrives in crises, but European populist parties failed to turn the coronavirus pandemic 
into political support. Populist actors could not 
blame anyone for the causes of the pandemic, 
something they have done during the financial 
(2008) and migration (2015) crises to obtain voters’ 
support.
The coronavirus breakout was accidental and 
beyond human control. As a result, society paid 
more attention to the serious implications of 
COVID-19 and ignored populists’ polarising 
tactics.
This is the key conclusion of DEMOS H2020 
research exploring how populists politicised the 
pandemic in eight European countries. The results 
have been recently published in print and ebook by 
Palgrave Macmillan. All book chapters are available 
for free download (see side box).
According to the publication, populists in 
opposition, in countries like Germany, France, and 
the UK, tried blaming governments’ responses to 
contain the virus. In power, populists in Hungary, 
Poland, and Czechia had no choice but push 
the virus beyond the political arena, calling for 
national unity instead. 
It worked better. Citizens were more warry of a 
deadly pandemic and its evolving and uncertain 
consequences. The urgency of the crisis left no 
space for populist strategies targeting health-
protection measures, as bitter as they could be. 
The evidence from the populist experiment during 
the pandemic is preliminary. But the impacts of the 
pandemic are yet to be seen.
In a post-COVID-19, populist forces in Europe 
might have enough of ammunition to fire at 
mainstream politicians in power which struggled 
to contain new variants or deploy efficient health 
measures – even if populists in opposition helped 
lay out the very same policies.◆
Citizens were more warry of a deadly pandemic 
and its evolving and uncertain consequences. 
The urgency of the crisis left no space for populist 
strategies targeting health-protection measures, as 
bitter as they could be. 
POPULISM AND THE PANDEMIC
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Book
 ▶ “Populism and the Politicisation of the 
COVID-19 Crisis in Europe”, by Palgrave 
Macmillan. Editors: Giuliano Bobba 
(University of Turin) and Nicolas Hubé 
(University of Lorraine). Download here.
Press Release
 ▶ “COVID-19 freezes support for populism, new 
book claims”. Read more here. 
Blog Posts
 ▶ “Populism and Covid-19 in Europe: What we 
learned from the first wave of the pandemic”, 
by Giuliano Bobba (University of Turin) and 
Nicolas Hubé (University of Lorraine). Read 
here.
 ▶ “Fear of COVID-19 and Populism”, by David 
Abadi and Agneta Fischer (University of 
Amsterdam). Read the post today.
Podcast
 ▶ “Not as Predicted? The Curious Case of 
European Populism During the COVID-19 
Pandemic. Listen to the episode today. 
Conference Video (in French)
 ▶ Follow the discussion here.
Paper
 ▶ “Anxious and Angry: Emotional Responses to 
the COVID-19 Threat”, by David Abadi, Irene 
Arnaldo, and Agneta Fischer (University of 
Amsterdam). Download the paper.
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DEMOS has dedicated a work package to examining populist governance and policymaking, an understudied topic in the literature about populism. That included assessing patterns of 
populist leaders’ policies in governing positions at different levels of decision making as well as 
populist parties’. Results reveal how populist actors make policy as well as the implications of 
these actions in comparison to mainstream politics. 
While in the literature it is a widely accepted view that populism, being a ‘thin ideology’ does 
not have general policy positions, DEMOS researchers identified a number of structural 
features of populist governance along the three dimensions of policy content, policy process 
and policy discourse and constructed an ideal-type model. 
Policy content: while it is true that the positions of populist actors show a great degree 
of variation in terms of policy proposals, they are typically ideologically heterodox; often 
challenge the established policy paradigms; generally reflect majoritarian preferences, and show 
hostility towards minority concerns; 
and imply radical and large-scale 
policy reforms.
Policy process: the anti-institutional, 
anti-elitist stance of populist 
leaders combined with their anti-
pluralism leads to circumventing the 
institutional venues of policymaking, and downplaying veto players; limiting the participation 
of experts, advocacy groups as well as the political opposition in the policy process; and 
communicating directly with the electorate about policy issues.
Policy discourses: populist leaders tend to employ a highly emotional, tabloid communication 
style with negative valence; a Manichean discourse; and a frequent use of discursive governance 
(trying to achieve policy goals through communicating about them).◆
DEMOS researchers identified a number of structural features 
of populist governance along the three dimensions of policy 




In investigating populist policymaking at the 
national level, the DEMOS teams in Europe 
elaborated the above-described new theoretical 
framework – the ideal type of populist 
policymaking – in contrast to usual policymaking 
patterns of liberal democracies.
The study involved applying a congruence analysis 
(pattern-matching analysis) to test the conformity 
of policymaking patterns of governments 
dominated by populist parties with the ideal 
type in seven countries and three policy areas 
(economic policy, criminal justice policy and 
family policy). 
Results point to a high degree of conformity 
between the ideal type of populist policymaking 
and the selected cases, especially in the policy 
discourse dimension. That constitutes the tendency 
of using crisis frames and polarising narratives to 
legitimise policy decisions.
The analysis also confirms that populist actors are 
effective policy reformers because they bypass 
usual governance mechanisms in the policy 
process. An unmediated form of governance 
boosts polarisation in reforms pertaining to 
justice policy, economic policy, and family policy – 
features that are rarely present in policymaking in 
liberal democracies.  
Not only do these findings support understanding 
of why populists survive in power even in the 
longer run. They also point to likely negative 
outcomes for ‘unpopular’ societal minorities such 
as LGBTQ communities, the poor, the Roma, and 
civil society groups with weak lobbying power.
These findings have policy implications. 
Preliminary assessment shows that policymakers in 
liberal democracies need to connect their messages 
with citizens’ needs more effectively. Promoting 
professional and independent media, as well as 
fact-checking initiatives in several policy areas 
in Europe, should also improve the environment 
against harmful populist narratives.◆
Paper
 ▶ “When Populist Leaders Govern: 
Conceptualising Populism in Policy Making.” 
Politics and Governance (2020). By Attila 
Bartha, Zsolt Boda, and Dorottya Szikra 
(Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest).
Download the publication.
Press Release
 ▶ “DEMOS Elaborates on How Populist Policies 
Work.” Read more today.
Video
 ▶ “DEMOS Explains How Populist Leaders Make 
Policy.” Watch now.
Working Paper
	▶ Upcoming:	“Populist Governance and Policies 
in Central Governments Led by Populist 
Parties”, by Attila Bartha (Centre for Social 
Sciences) et al. Follow updates here.
POPULIST GOVERNANCE AND POLICIES IN 
GOVERNMENTS LED BY POPULIST PARTIES
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Hungary is exam-
ined in the paper “When Populist Leaders Govern: Conceptu-
alising Populism in Policy Making”. Credit: EPP Official.
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Populist actors value traditional morality 
and see democracy as a practical opposition 
issue. But evidence shows that populist parties 
approach the profiles of established parties 
through experience in government.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Working Paper
 ▶ “Populist governance in regional and local 
government”, by Esther Pano (University of 
Barcelona) et al. Download here.
Podcast
 ▶ Episode #2: What triggers populism? Listen to 
the episode here.
Working Paper
 ▶ “Mapping Policy Patterns of Populist Parties. 
A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis”, by 
Oliver W. Lembcke (RUB). Download here.
Press Release
 ▶ In power, populist leaders establish governance 
style of mainstream politicians. Read here.
DEMOS performed a quantitative cross-country 
analysis on party manifesto data to find out how 
populist programmes shift over time and once in 
power. One important conclusion is that populist 
actors do not switch policy goals between ‘hot’ 
topics: they stick to their goals. But they do not 
place priority on their core policies like other 
political groups, such as the Greens do. Also, 
populist policy priorities are less clear-cut than 
those of all other non-populist parties. 
Some data suggests that populist governance is 
linked to corruption and political authority. In 
investigating this aspect, the research found that 
this opportunistic behaviour is a by-product of 
populist forces’ experience in power.
Furthermore, results show that populist actors 
value traditional morality and see democracy as a 
practical opposition issue. But important evidence 
shows that populist parties approach the profiles 
of established parties through experience in 
government. When they are not in power, populist 
actors and parties usually become more populists 
than their counterparts in governing parties. These 
differences are evident in both socio-cultural and 
socio-economic terms. 
Strikingly, populists in Central Eastern Europe 
have been found to be more pragmatic politicians 
than those in Western Europe.◆
POPULISM IN REGIONAL AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
POLICY PATTERNS OF 
POPULIST PARTIES
Besides zooming in on populist policies at country 
levels across Europe, DEMOS assessed governing 
populist parties and leaders at regional and local 
levels. It compared case studies in five European 
countries. Ten local governments and one regional 
government were selected for analysis based on 
legal and policy documents. More knowledge 
on populism at the local level offers a unique 
opportunity to understand how populist parties 
fare – and how voters react. 
Key takeaways are that populist parties seek 
electoral support by mixing strategies and 
ideologies and defending symbolic actions. 
When they come to positions of power, populist 
parties stumble on governance and institutional 
limits at the local level. As a result, conflicts may 
flare up. For instance, when local and national 
populist actions are misaligned within the party 
at different levels. In these cases, populists may 
pursue institutional change to push for the 
implementation of their political programmes. But, 
in general, populist politicians fail to meet voters’ 
expectations.◆
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DEMOS looked into EU (im)migration policy, 
an area of conflict between populism and the 
European Union. Results show a strong correlation 
between the ideological profile of the parties and 
their approach to the immigration crisis and the 
proposed EU response.
Right-wing parties, which score high in the 
populist index, took a strong stance against 
immigration and the EU. Centre- and left-wing 
parties took a more moderate approach. 
Researchers also analysed populist parties in the 
context of the European Parliament. Two key 
debates were scrutinised: the migration policy 
debate and the policy debate about the Eurozone 
crisis.  
When it comes to migration policy, preliminary 
findings suggest that populist parties have had very 
little impact on policymaking in the European 
Parliament. Belonging to a smaller party in the 
European Parliament seems unsuccessful, while 
belonging to a larger political party (such as 
the EPP) could guarantee some success. Co-
sponsorships of amendments typically come 
from the same political groups; there is no co-
sponsorships between different party groups. 
Research has also found a significant overlap 
between the policy preferences and discourses 
among parties in the right-wing spectrum, as well 
as some centrist groups. 
On the Eurozone crisis, research teams examined 
how populist views shaped the voting behaviours 
of the Parliament’s members (MEPs) during the 
Parliament’s management of 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. Topics of interest included assessing how 
populist policy positions were articulated in 
the debates, and how these discussions affected 
proposed reforms about economic governance. 
Results suggest that populist actors relied on their 
country’s sovereignty to object to mainstream and 
Populist actors in the European Parliament 
relied on their country’s sovereignty to object 
to mainstream and EU policy proposals. Their 
debates can be characterised by the use of 
historical parallels (Nazi/ Soviet dictatorships).
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Working Papers
 ▶ “The Populist Challenge of Common EU 
Policies. The Case of (Im)migration”, by Lukasz 
Gruszczynski (Centre for Social Sciences, CSS, 
and Kozminski University) et al. Download the 
study here.
 ▶ “Populist Parties: Migration Policy and 
Discourses in the European Parliament”, by Lena 
Karamanidou (Glasgow Caledonian University, 
GCU). Download the study.
 ▶ “Populist policy positions in the European 
Parliament”, by Balázs Horváthy and Viktor Szép 
(Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest). Download 
the study here.
Blog Posts
 ▶ “Populist Parties and Migration Policy: Evidence 
from the EU Parliament”, by Lena Karamanidou 
(Glasgow Caledonian University). Read the post.
POPULIST POLICIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
EU policy proposals, and their plenary debates can 
be characterised by the use of highly emotional 
language and a frequent use of historical parallels 
(Nazi/ Soviet dictatorships).
Despite appealing to sentiments that might work 
with voters, populist MEPs produced high-flown 
arguments, missed offering alternative solutions, or 
generated utterly heterodox proposals.◆
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DEMOS has explored the impacts of populism on democracy, including on political parties, the judiciary, citizens, and the media. Research shows that populists tend to hold illiberal 
views concerning check and balances, including the independent judiciary. Their policy 
proposals and measures often aim at undermining the independence of courts, weaken the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law.
At the same time, populist actors uphold proposals on strengthening direct and local 
democracy, although they have largely failed to implement those proposals. Populism also has a 
strong impact on ‘unpopular minorities’, targeted by adversarial populist discourses.
DEMOS research reconstructed the coping strategies of populists’ target groups, like 
immigrants, civil activists and LGBTQ+ people to the populist challenge. They include self-
censorship, echo-chambers, emigration and resistance.
DEMOS research has also studied populist communication on social media and the way it uses 
other media outlets. It was found that populist political leaders intensively use the social media 
and have a larger followership and effect than other politicians. Populists tend to build large 
and dense networks thus potentially creating echo-chambers for their followers.
Finally, DEMOS conducted research on 
the effect of populism on the party system. 
Evidence was found that populist politics 
represent new issues, and its ‘contagion’ 
effect on mainstream party politics is 
limited. However, populism seems to lead 
to the polarisation and fragmentation of 
party systems.◆
DEMOS research has studied populist 
communication on social media and the way 
it uses other media outlets. It was found that 
populist political leaders intensively use the 
social media and have a larger followership 
and effect than other politicians. 
THE IMPACTS OF POPULISM
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What are the consequences of populism for 
European democracies and the European project 
as well as its implications for legal procedures? 
Project research in this area focused on three 
important areas that have had little scientific input: 
that of constitutional democracy, representative 
democracy, and the European Union. DEMOS 
analysed the role of counter-majoritarian 
institutions, in other words, that of independent 
authorities, the judiciary, and constitutional courts. 
The key message is that populist leaders reform 
the judiciary to exert more power. Often, they 
justify those changes to democratic institutions 
and norms as a means to affirm the primacy of 
the people’s will. As a result, populist intervention 
in the judiciary has weakened the role of counter-
majoritarian institutions particularly in Eastern 
European countries. 
Populist-led governments in Hungary and 
Poland have appointed government-friendly 
judges to courts. Under these circumstances, the 
demarcation lines between the executive and the 
judiciary blur, the rule of law loses effectiveness, 
and what remains is democratic backsliding. 
Stronger populist control over the judiciary 
may result in less political freedom and fewer 
guarantees that the law is upheld and the rights of 
citizens are safeguarded.  
The EU has had to face a regional populist trend. 
Extensive research shows that a common effort 
between the European Commission and the EU 
Court of Justice in using infringement proceedings 
has been the most effective legal resource to protect 
the judiciary from further populist interference. 
Experience shows that resorting to Article 258 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union is more effective than invoking Article 7 of 
the Treaty on European Union. Article 7 was used 
against the populist governments of Hungary and 
Poland without effect.◆
Populist-led governments in Hungary and Poland have 
appointed government-friendly judges to courts. Under 
these circumstances, the demarcation lines between 
the executive and the judiciary blur, the rule of law 
loses effectiveness, and what remains is democratic 
backsliding. 
POPULISM AND THE JUDICIARY
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Working Paper
 ▶ “Populist constitutionalism. Its impacts 
on the Constitution, the Judiciary, 
and the Role of the EU”, by Josep 
Maria Castellà Andreu (University of 
Barcelona) et al. Read the study now.
Press Release
 ▶ “Populist Leaders Change the Judiciary 
to Increase Power”. Read more today.
Conference Videos
 ▶ Follow the DEMOS event with Venice 
Commission on populism and the law: 
day one and day two.
Podcast
 ▶ “Episode #3: Populism and the Rule of 
Law”.  
Follow the discussion here.
Blog Post
 ▶ “Populist Challenges to Constitutional 
Interpretation in Europe and Beyond”, 
by Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and Zoltán 
Szente (Centre for Social Sciences, 
Budapest).  
Read the post today.
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The relationship of the populist parties 
to liberal democracy is ambiguous: as 
illustrated above, the party manifestos 
contain a number of elements which, if 
implemented, would seriously affect the rule 
of law and the system of human rights.
POPULISM AND DEMOCRACY:
EXPLORING MANIFESTOS OF POPULIST PARTIES
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Upcoming
 ▶ Results will become available at the 
publications page of the project website.
Part of DEMOS’s research involved studying populist parties’ manifestos in Europe. The 
research zoomed in on whether populist parties’ pledges as presented in electoral party 
manifestos of selected populist political parties did comply (or not) with established democratic 
policies and rule of law principles.
While the relationship between populism and liberal democracy is generally seen as 
problematic, there are authors and interpretations arguing that populism is an essentially 
democratic phenomenon. Researchers analysed party manifestos and pledges assuming 
that they express basic ideas and policy proposals that the given party upholds. The analysis 
included the following countries with the following populist parties: Greece (GS and Syriza), 
France (RN), UK (UKIP), Turkey (AKP), 
Poland (PiS and Konfederacja), Slovakia (We 
are a family, OĽaNO), and Italy (Lega and 
M5S). 
The findings reveal that, indeed, the 
relationship of the populist parties to liberal 
democracy is ambiguous: as illustrated above, 
the party manifestos contain a number of 
elements which, if implemented, would 
seriously affect the rule of law and the system of human rights. At the same time, populist 
parties propose various measures to develop direct democracy, local democracy, government 
accountability and anti-corruption measures. Several of them have proposals to reform the 
judiciary with a potentially positive effect on court effectiveness.
Another conclusion is that policy proposals are multi-faceted, even across the ideological 
spectrum. Of course, as expected, nativist, right-wing populist parties have stronger proposals 
in terms of restricting human rights, especially those of immigrants or other minorities. But 
some ideas cut across ideologies and give a strange profile to the parties. The reasons for these 
variations need further research, but the role of (national and political) context is certainly 
important.◆
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Populist discourse in countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey have forced minority 
groups to socialise less, impose self-censorship, and move abroad. Only LGBTQ+ minorities 
have adopted a reactive strategy by taking to the streets and joining civil society groups against 
exclusionary populist policies. These are the key takeaways of new DEMOS H2020 research 
looking into how populism affects vulnerable citizens across Europe. 
DEMOS experts across Europe conducted interviews with over 80 people targeted by populism, 
including LGBTQ+, Roma, academics, migrants, and UK citizens opposing Brexit, in five 
European countries.
Populism builds on society’s perceived or imagined threats against its own traditions or culture, 
dividing society between a majority of ‘good’ people and a minority of ‘foes’ that it considers 
as a threat. But this is the first time that research casts light on how one group of foes – the 
minorities rejected by populism – copes with populist tactics. 
A quantitative analysis of Facebook posts 
in eight European countries also revealed 
important information about the ways 
in which populist parties and politicians 
communicate on social media and how the 
public receives their communication. 
Populist actors in all countries, except 
Poland and Turkey are more likely to talk 
about immigration as an issue. In Germany, France and the UK, populist actors also frequently 
discuss EU-related issues. ‘Democracy and legitimacy’ is another important topic populist 
parties often referred to. Populists talk more frequently about ‘democracy and legitimacy’ than 
mainstream parties in Germany, France, Italy and the UK do while they talk about these issues 
less than mainstream parties in Greece, Hungary and Turkey do.▶
CITIZENS TARGETED BY POPULISTS
DEMOS research has studied populist 
communication on social media and the way 
it uses other media outlets. It was found that 
populist political leaders intensively use the 
social media and have a larger followership 
and effect than other politicians. 
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Facebook users respond well to populist communication. Analysed data shows that populist 
actors’ posts obtain more reactions, shares and comments than mainstream political actors. 
Posts about ethnic minorities, including immigrants or asylum seekers, as well as country-
specific minorities like Roma in Hungary or Kurds in Turkey, trigger more reactions, and these 
posts are shared more. They obtain even more popularity than posts about other issues such as 
COVID-19, education, elections, and culture.◆
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Working Paper
 ▶ “Citizens’ reactions to populism 
in Europe: How do target groups 
respond to the populist challenge?”, by 
Osman Sahin (Glasgow Caledonian 
University) et al. Read the study now.
Press Release
 ▶ “Reacting to Populism, Minorities 
Impose Self-Censorship and Move 
Abroad”. Read more today.
Further Reading
 ▶ “Socio-Economic or Emotional 
Predictors of Populist Attitudes across 
Europe”, David Abadi (University of 
Amsterdam) et al. Download now.
Podcast
 ▶ “Episode #4: Populism Versus Anti-
Populism”. Listen to the episode now.
MINORITIES’ COPING STRATEGIES
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Populist leaders and parties have turned Facebook 
into an amplifier of right-wing political views. New 
DEMOS research found that populist actors in 
six out of eight European countries mostly share 
party propaganda and news associated with the 
right or far right. Political allies and thousands of 
loyal fan groups’ users share these posts, and what 
remains is a network of echo chambers reinforcing 
radicalised beliefs and populist attitudes in 
cyberspace.
To reach this conclusion, DEMOS research teams 
examined several news sources that populist 
parties and leaders share with their followers on 
Facebook, Europe’s favourite social media platform. 
These links included content produced by populist 
actors, professional media outlets, or alternative 
media such as blogs or fake news sites.
The study also mapped public pages sharing 
these posts, casting light on how populist content 
spreads on Facebook.
Seventeen populist actors and parties’ content in 
eight European countries were examined between 
April 2019, before the European Parliament 
elections, and April 2020, the beginning of the 
COVID-19 crisis. Selected populist leaders 
included well-known figures such as Marine Le 
Pen in France, Matteo Salvini in Italy, and Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey.
POPULIST NETWORKS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Over 50% of Marine le Pen’s media posts led users 
to radical right-wing content such as the French 
weekly “Valeurs Actuelles”. In Poland, right-wing 
views comprised over 60% of the links shared by 
the Confederation party.
Considering the enormous fan base of populist 
pages on Facebook – Marine Le Pen has over 1.5 
million followers – populist views spread far and 
wide, finding their mark among users prone to 
developing populist attitudes.◆
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Working Paper
 ▶ “Populism and the Media. A comparative 
analysis of populists’ shared content and 
networks on social media”, by Adina Marincea 
(School of Communication and Media) et al. 
Download the research.
Press Release
 ▶ “Populist Leaders Thrive on Social Media”. Read 
more today.
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DEMOS disentangled the influence populist 
parties exert on other political parties and the 
party system in Europe. Undertaking two parallel 
methodological venues (national qualitative case 
studies, on the one hand, quantitative analysis of 
MARPOR data on party manifestos and policy 
proposals, on the other) research teams tested 
four hypotheses: representation gap hypothesis 
(populist parties pursue a strategy that is designed 
to exploit gaps of representation by means of 
emphasising new or re-vitalising old conflicts); 
contagion hypothesis (the rise of populist parties is 
accompanied with an overall diffusion of populist 
ideas in the policy agenda of non-populist parties); 
polarisation hypothesis (the rise of populist parties 
makes party systems more acutely polarised) and 
elective affinity coalition hypothesis (populist 
parties enter governing coalitions with other 
populist parties and also with non-populist parties 
if the latter also employ at least one of the typical 
themes of populist discourse, e.g. nationalist, 
nativist, anti-establishment, Eurosceptic themes). 
The two methodologies yielded partly overlapping 
results. Both provided evidence supporting the 
representation gap hypothesis: with the populists’ 
electoral success, they represent new issues in 
Parliament. Concerning the contagion hypothesis, 
case studies offered mixed results: in some 
countries contagion can be observed, but not in 
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others; while the quantitative analysis did not offer 
robust results that would warrant confirmation of 
the hypothesis.
As for the polarisation hypothesis, the two methods 
offered somewhat different results: polarisation was 
identified as a clear tendency in the case studies, 
while quantitative data did not provide evidence for 
a general tendency towards polarisation. However, 
conform the case studies, at the country level we 
could gather several indications supporting a 
growing polarisation and fragmentation. Evidence 
supporting the elective affinity hypothesis was also 
mixed.◆
MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Working Papers
 ▶ “Impacts of Populism on the Party Systems”, by 
Martin Mejstřík (Charles University, Prague) et 
at. Download.
 ▶ “Mapping Policy Patterns of Populist Parties. 
A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis”, by 




DEMOS (Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe) is a research and 
innovation project studying populism and its impacts on democracy. Funded by the EU 
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme, the project is carried out by 15 partner institutions 
in Europe and involves 10 scientific disciplines. DEMOS investigates the phenomenon of 
populism through the lenses of democratic efficacy. The idea combines attitudinal features 
(political efficacy), political skills, knowledge, and democratic opportunity structures. A novelty, 
democratic efficacy is understood as a condition of political engagement needed to address the 
challenges of populism.
Specifically, DEMOS addresses under-researched aspects of populism at micro-, meso-, and 
macro-levels: its socio-psychological roots, social actors’ responses to the populist challenge, 
and populism’s effects on governance. DEMOS focuses not only on the polity, but equally on 
citizens’ perspectives: how they are affected by, and how they react to populism. Politically 
under-represented groups and those targeted by populist politics are of particular concern. 
Examples include youth, women and migrants. 
As populism has varying socially embedded manifestations, DEMOS aims at contextualising 
it through comparative analysis on the variety of populisms across Europe, including their 
historical, cultural, and socio-economic roots, manifestations, and impacts. DEMOS develops 
indicators and predictors of populism and elaborates scenarios on the interactions of populism 
with social actors and institutions 
both at the national and the EU 
levels.
DEMOS combines in-depth 
research on populism and 
democratic efficacy with action 
research and pilot projects in 
order to develop lasting tools and 
timely policy recommendations. Project methods include experiments, deliberative polling, 
text mining, surveys, and legal analysis. DEMOS places strong emphasis on communication 
and productive interactions with a variety of stakeholders throughout the project, including 
policymakers, journalists, students, and the general public.◆
DEMOS addresses under-researched aspects of 
populism at micro-, meso-, and macro-levels: its 
socio-psychological roots, social actors’ responses 
to the populist challenge, and populism’s effects 
on governance.
Follow DEMOS today




DEMOS is led by the Centre for Social Sciences, an 
Excellence Centre of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in 
Budapest, and carried out in partnership with 15 institutions 
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The DEMOS H2020 Advisory Board 
(AB) is comprised of invited external 
scientific experts and representatives 
of governmental and civil society 
organisations with an interest in pop-
ulism and democratic efficacy. The AB 
works with the project management 
to ensure quality assurance for project 
activities. The Board, which has val-
idated previous DEMOS research, is 
comprised of the following experts:
Professor of Public Law at the University 
of Siena (Italy). Groppi is a former legal 
advisor at the Italian Constitutional Court 
and a member of the Group of Independent 
Experts on the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government of the Council of 
Europe. She has expertise in comparative 
law, constitutional justice, federalism, local 
government, and constitution building.
PROF TANIA GROPPI
Chair of the Advisory Board
Associate Professor, Erhart completed her 
M.Phil. at the University of Cambridge and 
PhD at Bogaziçi University in philosophy. 
She is the author of the book “What Am 
I?” and several articles and book chapters 
on gender, sports, human rights, social 
movements and media. Itir Erhart is also 
long-distance runner, a social entrepreneur 
and an Ashoka Fellow. She is the co-founder 
of Adim Adim, Turkey’s first charity 
running group.
DR ITIR ERHART
Markert was Secretary of the Venice 
Commission (Council of Europe) between 
2010 and 2020. He obtained a Doctorate 
of Law at Tübingen University in 1989. 
Following his work as a practising lawyer 
in Germany, he joined the Council of 
Europe in 1989 and worked for the Venice 
Commission as from 1992. The main focus 
of his work was on issues of the rule of 
law and state organisation in Central and 
Eastern Europe and Turkey.
DR THOMAS MARKERT
Senior Lecturer in Social Psychology at the 
Open University, UK. Founding member of 
the Public Dialogue Psychology Collaboratory 
(PDPC) and Chair of the British Psychological 
Society, Political Psychology Section. She is 
section editor on the Journal of Social and 
Political Psychology and is on the board of the 
IMISCOE Standing Committee on Reflexive 
Migration Studies. Her work topics include 
migration-mobility, non-mobility, integration 





Professor of Sociology of Communication and Political 
Communication at the University of Milan. Fellow of 
the International Communication Association (ICA). 
Member of the editorial board of the European Journal 
of Communication and other international journals. 
Founder of the Italian scholarly journal Comunicazione 
Politica. Editor-in-Chief of the International 
Encyclopedia of Political Communication (Wiley 
2016). His research focuses on political communication, 
especially on the relations between media and populism, 
and between pop culture and politics.
PROF GIANPIETRO MAZZOLENI
Professor of Political Science. Director of Masaryk Institute 
of Advanced Studies, Czech Technical University. She is 
a former member of Executive Committee of IPSA and 
president of the Czech Political Science Association (2000-
2006). Her fields of interest are comparative transitions to 
democracy, civil society, populist and radical right wing 
parties and movements, corruption. In November 2003, 
Professor Dvořáková became the first woman among the 
professors of political science appointed in the Czech 
Republic.
PROF VLADIMÍRA DVOŘÁKOVÁ
Full professor of Public Law at the Uniwersytet 
Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie. Professor 
Granat is a head of the Department of Constitutional 
Law.  His main research topics are  constitutional law 
(among others, theory of constitutional law, principles 
of law,constitutional values,  constitutional change, 
constitutional identity, the origins of the constitutional 
judiciary), human rights, budget balance. He has 
published around 200 scientific works. Granat is a former 
judge of the local Constitutional Court (2007 – 2016).
Associate Professor in the Political Studies Division at the 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE). 
Currently she is a Research Excellence Fellow at the Central 
European University (CEU) and a Visiting Researcher 
at the Institute for Political Science at the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Her main research interests are the 
effect of different social contexts on political behaviour, 
authoritarian and populist predispositions in comparative 
perspective, and the improvement of measurement and 
meaning of partisanship in new democracies.◆  




DEMOS has two sister projects. This 
means projects funded by the Hori-
zon 2020 framework programme 
with the same goal: use innovative 
research to understand and help ad-
dress the populist challenge in Europe. 
PaCE (Populism and Civic Engagement), comprised 
of nine institutions in Europe, aims to combat the 
negative tendencies of populist movements, to build 
upon the lessons of positive examples, and play a part 
in constructing a firmer democratic and institutional 
foundation for European citizens. PaCE analyses the 
type, growth, and consequences of these movements, 
looking at both their characteristics and context. It will 
also propose responses to challenges associated with 
populism and develop risk-analyses. More information 
about the PaCE project here.◆ 
POPREBEL
POPREBEL (Populist Rebellion Against Modernity), 
comprised of seven institutions in Europe, aims 
at taking stock of the recent rise of populism – in 
its various forms – in Central and Eastern Europe, 
including the Western Balkans. Its trajectory is not only 
interesting in and of itself: it is also the harbinger of a 
possible future for the whole continent. POPREBEL 
describes the phenomenon, creates a typology of its 
various manifestations, reconstructs trajectories of its 
growth and decline, investigates its causes, interprets 
its meanings, diagnoses its consequences, and proposes 
policy solutions. More about POPREBEL here.
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